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1. Introduction
A simple game with transferable utility on a set N of players is
one in which the characteristic function v takes on only the values and 1,
and in which v(S) =» 1 implies v(T) 1 for all S C T C N. Such games arise
naturally as models of political or economic situations in which every
coalition of players is either 'winning* or 'losing'.
In this paper we will investigate indices which reflect the relative
power of each position (or player) in a simple game. We will show that both
the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index correspond to won Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, which differ only in their posture towards
risk. Chiefly, we will be applying the techniques developed in [9] to the
results presented in [5] and [6].
2. Historical Background
A game on a finite universal set N of positions may be considered
N
to be any function v : 2 -> R such that v($) =0. In [10], the value of a
game v is defined to be a vector valued function <KV ) = (<K (v) , . . . , $ (v)jI n
which associates a real number (j>.(v) w th each position i £ N, and which
obeys the following conditions.
/I
2.1) For each permutation tt : N -* N, <$> . (ttv) = $ . (v)
.
II
TT1 x
2.2) For each carrier " T of v, I <j>
.
(v) - v(T).
i€T L
2.3) For any games v and w, $(v + w) <j>(v) + ij>(w).
Shapley showed that the unique value defined on all games has the
form
vv) - & ( (s " 1) ;,^' s)! )(v(s) - v(S - d)
where s and n denote the cardinality of the sets S and N.

In [11] this value is studied in the context of simple games.
Observe that if v is a simple game, then the quantity (v(S) - v(S - i))
equals unless S is a winning coalition and (S - i) a losing coalition, in
which case it equals 1. Consequently, if we suppose that players in a simple
game v 'vote' in random order, then <{>,(v) is precisely the probability that
I
player i will cast a 'pivotal' vote. As such, it can be viewed as an a prior i
index of power in simple games, and is referred to as the Shapley-Shubik index.
However if only simple games are to be considered, the conditions
(2*1), (2.2), and (2.3) no longer specify a unique functional form. This is
because condition (2.3) becomes non-binding, since the class of simple games
is not closed under addition. (So if v and w are non-trivial simple games,
v(N) w(N) 1, and the game v + w is not simple, since v(N) + w(N) =2.)
Another value for simple games which has received attention in the literature
Is the Banzhaf index, first Introduced in [1].
The Banzhaf index takes as a measure of power the relative ability
of players to transform winning coalitions into losing coalitions, and vice
versa. Defint a swing for position i c N to be a pair (S, S - i) such that
the coalition S is winning, and S - i is losing (i.e. v(S) «= 1 and v(S - i) -
Let n (v) denote the number of swings for position i in game v, and let
T(v) - I n.(v). Then the Banzhaf index of relative power for each position
i£N "
is
S. (v) » n.(v)/T(v) for i - l,...,n.
X X
We will refer to n
.
(v) as the non-normalized Banzhaf index.
The Shapley-Shubik and the (normalized or non-normalized) Banzhaf
indices yield different rankings of the positions in a given simple game.

Consequently it is desirable to find a common interpretation of the indices
which will permit us to investigate their differences and similarities. This
task is facilitated by the following two propositions, which are presented
in [5] and [6].
Proposition 1 (Dubey) : The Shapley-Shubik index is the unique function <J>
defined on simple games which satisfies conditions (2.1) and (2.2) and which
has the property that
(2.4) For any simple games v, w <f> (v V w) + $ (v A w ) " <J>(v) + <j>(w)
where the games (v V w) and (vAw) are defined by
| 1 if v(S) =1 or w(S) - 1
(v\/w)(S) «/
j otherwise
v
and j'l if v(S) - 1 and w(S) - 1
(v Aw)(S) *<
j otherwise,
k
Proposition 2 (Dubey) : The non-normalized Banzhaf index is the unique furc.
defined on sitjle games which satisfi*. ; the following fo ir conditions.
II
(2.5) If i £ N is a dummy in v, then r\ (v) =
(2.6) E- n.(v) - T(V)
i£N J
(2.7) 'For each premutation ir : N •> N, n ,(/rv) = n. (v)
Tri i
(2.8) For any simple games, v, w <j>(v V w) + <J) (v A w) = <j>(v) + 4>(w).
In the next section, we shall use these propositions to show that
<}>, n, and 3 can be viewed as cardinal utility functions which dif ro.r only ir
their posture towards risk. It will be seen that conditions (2. 1, or (2
express a posture towards one kind of risk, while the somewhat opaque condi-
tions (2.4) or (2. 3) express a posture towards another kind of r5 ;k.

3 • Utility Functions for Simple Games
Let C be the class of simple games defined on a finite set N, and
let M be the mixture space generated by C * N. Then the elements of M are
elements (w, ±) of C x N, and lotteries of the form [p(w, i); (1 - p)(v, j)]
i±
where (w, i) and (v, j) are in C x N, and p is a probability (i.e. p € [0, 1]).
/5
Let P be a (strict) preference relation defined on M. (Read
(w, i)P(v, j) as 'it is preferable to play position i in game w than to play
position j in game v f ). We will take P to be continuous on M; i.e. if a, b,
c 6 M such that aPbPc, then there exists a (unique) q 6 (0, 1) such that
bl[qa; (1 -q)c].
Denote by v and v the games defined by
R U
1 if R c S ; v (S) - for all S c N
v
R
(S) - /
i otherwise.
For each i £ N denote by D. c C the set of simple games for which player i
is a dummy. We will take P to have the following properties.
(3.1) For all " 6 C, i £ N and every permutation tt : N -*• N,
(v, i)I(irv, TTi)
(3.2) For every i
€
N, v £ D. implies (v, i)I(v , i) and (v., i)P(vQ , i)
.
for every v £ C, (v., i)R(v, i)R(vQ , i)
.
It is well known (cf. [7j) that such a preference can be represented
by a cardinal utility function 9; i.e. a function 6 such that for all a,
b
€
M
e(a) > 6(b) iff aPb,
and 8 ([pa; (1 - p)b}) = p9(a) + (1 - p)9(b).

Furthermore, 6 is unique up to an affine transformation, so we can set
8(v
,
i) = 1 ?ud 9 (vn» *•) = °« For a"" arbitrary element (v, i) of C x N
we have
6
i
(v> = 9(v, i) - q,
where q is the number such that
(v, i)I[q(vr i); (1 - q)<V , i)],
By the continuity of P ?.nd condition (3.2), 9 (v) is well defined.
We have yet to completely specify the preference P. We do so by
expressing the preferences involving two kinds of risk.
f *."\) Ordinary risk neutrality: for all simple games v, w
l| (v, i); \ (w, i)]I[i (vVw); \ (vAw)]
(3.4) Strategic risk neutrality: for all R C N and i
€
R>
(v
R ,
i)I[| (v
jL
, i); (1 - i)(vQ , i)].
Condition (3,3) specifies indifference between two lotteries:
note that the condition is plausible;, since (v V w) = v anc* (v /\ w) < w.
Condition (3.4) specifies indifference between playing the game v as one of
r players in the unique minimal winning coalition, or participating in a
lottery which gives probability - of being a dictater and probability (1 - -)
of beipg a dummy. Ifote that the risk involved in playing the game v is
strategic rather than probabilistic—no gamble is involved.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 1: if P is a preference obeying conditions (3.1) through (3.4), ther

the unique utility 9 such that 8. (v.) ~ 1 and 6 CO = is equal to the
Shapley-Shubi 1 index.
Lemma 1 : If P obeys condition (3 len, for every v t C, i £ N and per-
mutation tt : N -* N,
6.(v) * 6 (irv).
! 'if X
Proof: Immediate from (3,1) and the definition of utility.
Lemma 2 : If P obeys conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4) then for each R ^ N,
i £ R
r
X *
I i t R.
Proof: If i f 1 then (v , i)I(vQ , i) by (3.2), and so 8.. (vR)
= q±(vq> = °'
t
If i R, then 8.(v_) = - by (3.4) and the definition of the utility 6.i R t
Lemma 3 : If P obeys condition (3.3), then
e
.
(v y w) + e . (v A w) » e . (v) + e . (w)
.
Proof: From the definition of utility,
;[~ ((vVw) Aw),
= | e((v Vw), i) + \ e(vAw), i]
2
and 6[|(v, i); |(w, i) ] - | 6(v, i) + | 8(w, i).
Consequently, by condition (3,3) we nave
| 6(v, i) + | 6(w, i) ' - | 8{(v Vw), i) + \ 9((vAw), i>

So far we have demonstrated that 9 obeys conditions (2.1) and (2.4),
and that for every R (~ N, 8 (v ) - <j>(v ); i.e. S coincides with the Shapley-
Shubik index on the games v . (Note that conditions (2.1) and (2-2) determine
F.
the value of 4(v ).) To complete the proof of the theorem, we show that 3
R
coincides with f on every game v
Proof of Theorem It Let v £ C, and let R, , R„, . .., R, a N be all the
distinct minimal winning coalitions of v, Then we say the game v is in
class k, and note that
R
l
R
2 \
If v is in class k * 0, then v - vn and 6 (v) = <j)(v) =0. If v is
in class k = 1, then v - v , and 9(v) is defined by Lemma 2, and is equal
to <|>(v).
Suppose that for games v in classes k - 1,2,... ,m it has been shown
that 9 is well defined and coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index. Consider
a game v in class m + I. Then
v = v V vD V . . . V v_ V v_ - w V v_,
2 m\
where w is a game in class m.
So, by Lemma 3,
>
±
<v) = 6
1
(wVv
R
) = e
j[
(w) + 9.(v
R
) - 9
i
(wAv
R)
But we will show that the game (wA v ) cannot be in a higher class than w,
so by the inductive hypothesis the terms on the right hand side of the above
expression are uniquely determined and equal to the Shapley-Shubik indi
Consequently (from property (2.4) of <j>) we will h3ve shown that 9(v) = (j>(v )

for all simple games v.
To ?«e that the game w* - (v ,A v } . be in a higher class than
R
the game w, consider a minimal winning coalition S of the game v? s . By the
definition of w 1 we know SDR and w(S) =1. If S - R. then w* = v
R
and we are done (sine for the game vn , every game has at least one
minimal winning coalition). Otherwise S - S' U R where S f is non-empty and
disjoint from R. Then, there exists an S, C $ such that S jS', and S is
i l x
minimal winning in the game w.
Consider now a coalition T r S such that T is also minimal winning
in w' and T = T ! UR where T' is non-empty and disjoint from R. Then there
is a coalition T z> T* which is minimal winning in w.
But any coalition which contains both T., and S. cannot be minimal
1 i.
winning in w, since it is not contained in any minimal winning coalition of w'.
Consequently every minimal winning coalition in w' can be identified with a
distinct minimal winning coalition in w, so w 1 cannot be in a higher class
than w. This completes the proof.
So tie Shapley-Shubik index s the utility function representing
preferences described by conditions (3.1) through (3.4). Naturally, different
preferences will give rise to different uti ;ns. Suppose, for
instance, that the pestta rards strategic risk is represented not by
condition (3.4) but by the i i :.ng condition for every R c N and i £ R.
(3.5) [j+j (vR , 1); (1 - 5jK)(V i)!I[i (v., 1); (1 - i)(v , i) ]
i the following theorem says that the non-normalized Banzhaf
index is a cardinal utility for the preference relation P.
orem 2 : If P is a preference obeying conditions (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and

tl- L
(3.5) , then the unique utility such that 6 . (v . ) - 2 and 6 . (v ) =
is equal to t^e non-normalized Sanzha'' Index.
The proof is precisely lik< >f of TheoreTa 1, once it has
been observed chat condition (3.5) im-olles
:
—
- i oi i K R
r
e
±
(vR)
= n.o
for i $ R
\
So the non-normalized Banzbaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index
reflect preferences which differ only in their posture towards strategic
risk. Similarly it is not difficult to show that the ordinary (normalized)
Banzhaf index corresponds to preferences which obey condition (3,4) but not
condition (3.3). That is, the Banzhaf index reflects preferences which are
neutral to strategic risk, but not to ordinary risk. The normalization has
the effect of changing the risk posture, since each game is normalised
independently (i.e. each game v is normalized by T(v).)
4. Discussxon
nave seen that the difference between the Shapley-Shuhik index
and the non-normalized Banzhaf index results fro:n different postures towards
strategic risk. 'That is, the two indices reflect different attitudes towards
the relative benefits of engaging in strategic interaction with other players
in games of the form v .
The difference between the Shapley-Shubik index and the ordinary
Banzhaf index y en the other hand, reflects different postures towards ordinary
k —the kind which results from lotteries, rather than from strategic
interactions. Thus the difference between these two indices seems to be

10
essentially non-game- theoretic (cf. [3] pp.. L95-196
i- aatural to consider a -hole spectrum of T isk postures, and
to examine the resulting uti! it seems likely that this point
of view will serve to illuminate some rk (cf. [2], [4], [8])
on alternative formulations of the val

11
Footnotes
1) A permutation n : N » N is one~to onto. The game irv is
defined by irv(irS) - '
2) A carrier of a game v is any coalition I C N such that for all
S - iS, v(S) = v(S l » T) . The smallest carrier in a gam;; may be viewed
as the set of active players
3) A dummy in a game v is an i £ N such chat n , (v) = 0.
4) We assume the usual properties of mixture spaces: i.e. for all
elements a, b
€ M and ail probabilities p and q, we have
[la; (1 - l)b] - a;
[pa; (1 - p)b] * [(1 - p)b; pa];
and jq[pa; (1 - p)b]; (1 - q)b = [qpa; (1 - qp)bj.
5) For a, b € M we write alb (a is indifferent to b) if neither aPb
nor bPa, We write aRb if either aPb or alb
s
and assume that R is a
transitive, complete order on M. Furthermore, we assume that if alb
then for every c £ M and p € [0, 1]
[pa; (1 - p)c]I[pb; (1 - p)c].
6) A coalition R c N is minimal winning in v if v(R) - 1 and if S a R,
S f R implies v(S) - 0.
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